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Fine-grained Address Space Randomization has been considered as an effective protection
against code reuse attacks such as ROP/JOP. However, it only employs a one-time randomization,
and such a limitation has been exploited by recent just-in-time ROP and side channel ROP, which
collect gadgets on-the-fly and dynamically compile them for malicious purposes. To defeat
these advanced code reuse attacks, we propose a new defense principle: instantly obsoleting
the address-code associations. We have initialized this principle with a novel technique called
virtual space page table remapping and implemented the technique in a system CHAMELEON.
CHAMELEON periodically re-randomizes the locations of code pages on-the-fly. A set of tech-
niques are proposed to achieve our goal, including iterative instrumentation that instruments a
to-be-protected binary program to generate a re-randomization compatible binary, runtime virtual
page shuffling, and function reordering and instruction rearranging optimizations. We have tested
CHAMELEON with over a hundred binary programs. Our experiments show that CHAMELEON
can defeat all of our tested exploits by both preventing the exploit from gathering sufficient
gadgets, and blocking the gadgets execution. Regarding the interval of our re-randomization, it
is a parameter and can be set as short as 100ms, 10ms or 1ms. The experiment results show that
CHAMELEON introduces on average 11.1%, 12.1% and 12.9% performance overhead for these
parameters, respectively.
1
1 Introduction
Code reuse attacks, such as return-oriented programming (ROP)[40, 12, 9, 37], recently have been used
to exploit vulnerabilities in widely used commercial software such as Internet Explorer [26] and Adobe
Reader [17]. ROP attacks hijack program control flow to execute code snippets (i.e., “gadgets") that are
elaborately selected from shared libraries or the application code. Without injecting any code, ROP can
easily bypass data execution prevention (DEP) [30, 31]. There have been two major lines of research towards
defeating ROP: Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [1, 23, 44, 47, 18, 48, 8] and Address Space Randomization
(ASR) [4, 5, 46, 36, 43, 45, 24, 34, 27, 3].
Recent efforts on ASR have been pushing the randomization to be more fine-grained [45, 24, 34, 27, 3] to
defend advanced ROP attacks (e.g., [37]). Unfortunately, there is an emerging trend in the attacker community:
ROP attacks are launched together with memory disclosure attacks [13, 42, 39]. This results in a new type
of “one-two punch" ROP attacks. A real world “one-two punch" ROP of this type is the just-in-time ROP
(JIT-ROP) [41]. Besides memory disclosure attacks, side channel attacks can also be combined with traditional
ROP attacks to form another type of “one-two punch" ROP attacks (we call SC-ROP) [7, 38]. “One-two
punch" ROP attacks can circumvent the most advanced ASR techniques, including fine-grained ASR. Before
explaining why the “one-two punch" ROP attacks are hard to be defended, we would like to give a short
introduction of these attacks.
A JIT-ROP attack first exploits a memory disclosure vulnerability to get one page of memory. By disassem-
bling the initial page, the attacker aims to find local gadgets. If local gadgets are insufficient, the attack will (1)
find locations of other pages by analyzing the current page; (2) exploit the memory disclosure vulnerability
again to get those pages; (3) scan the newly obtained pages to identify more gadgets. Note that the attack
does not continue scanning pages next to the current page to avoid causing problems such as segmentation
fault. Finally, the attack “compiles" the start addresses of the identified gadgets and the data these gadgets
will use into a malicious payload.
SC-ROP attacks collect gadgets on-the-fly in a different way from JIT-ROP attacks. By exploiting a
vulnerability such as buffer overflow, a SC-ROP attack can redirect the execution to a specific location. The
execution behaviors after the redirection enable the attack to infer what instructions have been executed.
Useful behaviors include execution status (e.g., crash or hang-up) [7], execution results (e.g., program output)
[38], and execution time [38]. By iteratively changing the redirecting locations and inferring the executed
instructions, the attack can understand where valid instructions are located and what these instructions are.
We can notice that the above two types of “one-two punch" ROP attacks share a common feature that
they identify address-code associations on-the-fly. For a process, we say an address A and an instruction I
forms an address-code association if I resides at logical address A. Existing ASR techniques randomize the
address-code associations for one time before the execution (e.g., at load-time). Such a strategy randomizes
the mapping from the code layout in the binaries on disk to code layout in the memory and thus, raises the
bar for traditional ROP attacks that rely on the mapping information. However, “one-two punch" ROP attacks
identify the address-code associations during execution time and doing this requires no knowledge about the
mapping. This leads to the fact that “one-two punch" ROP attacks bypass existing ASR or fine-grained ASR
techniques. Making the randomization granularity finer and finer is not an effective principle to change the
fact.
For ASR techniques to defeat “one-two punch" ROP attacks, a fundamentally new principle is required.
In this paper, we propose such a new defense principle, namely, Let the address-code associations quickly
become obsolete. There are two implications from this principle:
• Implication 1: the address-code associations used by “one-two punch" ROP attacks should become
obsolete before the ROP shellcode is executed.
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• Implication 2: the legitimate binary should be able to use the valid address-code associations, no matter
how frequently the associations keep changing.
The new principle is inspired by two weaknesses of an “one-two punch" ROP attack. First, the attack needs
an unavoidable time window to achieve its goal. The time window consists of two parts: (t1) the time the
attack takes to identify the address-code associations; (t2) the time the attack takes to construct the malicious
payload. Second, the address-code associations used to construct the payload must be valid until the execution
of ROP payload (i.e., the execution is directed by the payload). Otherwise, the instructions residing in the
addresses would not be the intended ones when the ROP payload is executed.
The two weaknesses imply two properties of an ASR technique that enforces the new principle. First, how
quickly the ASR technique should obsolete the address-code associations is determined by the unavoidable
time window (i.e., t1 + t2). Second, the “one-two punch" ROP attack is guaranteed to fail when the ASR is
deployed. The reason is that the first implication of the principle takes advantage of the second weakness of
“one-two punch" ROP attacks. However, to our best knowledge, there exists no ASR techniques enforcing the
new principle.
In this paper, we propose a novel ASR technique, virtual address page table remapping (VAPTR), to
enforce the new principle. VAPTR periodically randomizes the locations of code pages on-the-fly. Essentially,
the address-code associations become obsolete after each round of re-randomization. Our experiments show
that VAPTR can make the obsoleting cycle quicker than the unavoidable time window of “one-two punch"
ROP attacks. We have developed a system named as CHAMELEON1 to implement the VAPTR technique.
Overview of the CHAMELEON system is presented in §2.3.
The main contributions of our work are as follows.
• We propose a new fundamental defense principle for ASR techniques to defeat “one-two punch" ROP
attacks. Enforcement of the principle in ASR techniques is guaranteed to be invincible by ‘one-two
punch" ROP attacks.
• We propose a novel VAPTR technique to enforce our defense principle. This technique involves a new
type of binary instrumentation.
• We have developed the CHAMELEON system to implement the VAPTR technique. Experimental results
with over a hundred binary programs show that CHAMELEON is able to defeat “one-two punch" ROP
attacks with very low overhead, for instance: httpd with 9.1%-11.7%, lighttpd with 13.8%-16.7%, and
nginx with 18.1%-20.7% when setting the randomization intervals to be 100ms and 1ms, respectively.
2 System Overview
2.1 Threat Model
In the threat model, we assume a program runs in a Linux operating system with DEP and ASLR enabled. The
victim program contains a memory corruption vulnerability. The attacker aims at exploiting this vulnerability
to execute arbitrary malicious logic through ROP. The attacker is assumed to be able to: (1) access the
executable (or the source codes) of the program; (2) control major input channels to the process, including
standard inputs, file streams, and network traffics; (3) identify address-code associations at runtime, either
via memory disclosure attacks or side channel attacks; (4) find sufficient useful instructions (or gadgets).
However, the attacker has not gained the root privilege to access the OS kernel. In addition, the attacker needs
an unavoidable time window to identify address-code associations and construct the payload.
1CHAMELEON stands for CHAnge the MEmory Layout pEriodically and ON-the-fly.
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Figure 1: High level idea of VAPTR.
2.2 Approach Overview
At a high level, our VAPTR technique periodically randomizes the mapping between the logical page numbers
and the physical page numbers of code pages. We keep the physical address space unchanged and shuffle the
code pages in the logical address space during each cycle of randomization. As presented in Figure 1, part of
the layout of the logical address space after cycle i and cycle i+ 1 are shown as the left part and right part,
respectively. Note that the code inside a physical page (e.g., Page i1) will never be moved to another physical
page. So the dotted arrow between the left part and the right part means the codes in a page (e.g., Page i1) are
kept unchanged, but the logical addresses of the codes are changed (e.g., logical addresses of codes in Page i1
are changed from being inside the first logical page to being inside the third logical page).
When the randomizing cycle is shorter than the unavoidable time window, VAPTR follows the new defense
principle and is guaranteed to defeat the threat model. To implement the VAPTR technique and enforce the
new principle, several problems must be resolved. We briefly present these problems and our solutions as
follows.
Where and how to generate the randomized mapping information. Technically, the randomized mapping
information can be generated either in the user space or the kernel space of a process. However, generating
such information in the user space leads to two attack surfaces. First, the randomized mapping information is
maintained in the user space. The attacker can launch memory disclosure attacks to get such information and
bypass the defense. Second, the mapping information generator code reside in the user space. The attacker
might reuse the generator to learn the randomization logics or even perform de-randomization. So we choose
to generate the randomized mapping information in the kernel space.
Regarding how to generate the randomized mapping information, there are two main options. First, we can
modify the page table but find a way to avoid crashing the program. Second, we do not modify the page table
but find a way to periodically modify the logical addresses used by the program. We choose the first option
and propose a novel way to avoid crashing the program.
During each randomization cycle, we modify the page table to randomly generate a new bijection between
the logical page numbers and the physical page numbers. As for how to avoid crashing the program, we
present the solution in the next paragraph.
How to maintain the normal execution of the program. If we do not instrument the program code,
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Figure 2: An Overview of CHAMELEON.
whenever the page table is modified, the program will crash2. So the primary issue is how to instrument the
code so that arbitrary page table modification is accommodated. We address this issue in a novel way. In
particular, we add one layer of indirection between the program code and the page table.
This layer of indirection is implemented through a second table in the kernel space, which is the logical
to logical mapping table (L2L table). For a code page, its logical page number before the first cycle of the
randomization is defined as the before-randomization logical page number. After that, the logical page number
of the page is called as after-randomization logical page number. Note that the after-randomization logical
page number changes with time. The L2L table records the mapping between the before-randomization
logical page numbers and the after-randomization logical page numbers. The L2L table and the page table
will form a two-step mapping. A before-randomization logical page number can be mapped to the correct
physical page number through the two-step mapping. The L2L table plays a critical role in our solution. On
one hand, it enables the page table to be modified in arbitrary way. On the other hand, it enables all programs
to be instrumented in an unified way.
The remaining issue is how to instrument the program to use the L2L table. Our approach is to statically
rewrite the binary executables. The rewriting is specific to the types of instructions. We classify instructions
into two types: inter-page instructions and intra-page instructions. Inter-page instructions refer to control
flow transfer instructions whose target addresses go across the current code page. In this paper, we regard
control flow transfer instructions as the set of (a) direct jump, (b) indirect jump, (c) conditional jump, (d)
direct call, (e) indirect call, and (f) ret. Instructions other than inter-page instructions are classified as
intra-page instructions.
2If we do not instrument the program code, we need to make the kernel intercept each instruction. A possible way is to enforce the
execution of any instruction to cause a page fault exception.
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During the rewriting, we replace each inter-page instruction with a customized system call3. In our design of
VAPTR, we enforce the target address of any inter-page instruction to be the before-randomization value (see
§3.2.5 for details). The system call will use L2L table to translate the page number of the before-randomization
target address. For intra-page instructions, we keep them unchanged and guarantee that the execution will
never go wrong (please refer to §3.1.1).
How to defeat the attacker. Suppose the attacker selects to launch a JIT-ROP attack. During the attack, the
attacker gets a gadget at address A1 via memory disclosure attacks. The address A1 later on becomes part of
the ROP payload. In total, the attacker spends Tw on getting the gadgets and constructing the payload. When
the payload is getting executed, A1 will be translated through the page table. However, during Tw, the page
table is randomized at least once. To this end, A1 will be translated to an irrelevant physical address during
the execution of the ROP payload. The situation of defending against SC-ROP attacks is similar.
The attacker might extend the JIT-ROP attacks through reusing our system call. How we handle such
extended attacks will be discussed in §3.2.6.
2.3 Chameleon Architecture Overview
We develop CHAMELEON to implement the VAPTR technique. CHAMELEON consists of two components: a
static binary rewriter and a kernel space VAPTR unit.
Given a to-be-protected binary program, the rewriter instruments the binary to make it compatible with
VAPTR. Specifically, the rewriter will replace each inter-page instruction with our system call sys_jit. At
runtime, the instrumented program will invoke the system call to use the L2L table for address translation.
The kernel space VAPTR unit consists of three components: a kernel thread kth_jit, the L2L table, and
a customized system call sys_jit. kth_jit periodically randomizes the page table and updates the L2L
table correspondingly. When the instrumented program needs to use the L2L table for address translation, it
will invoke the sys_jit. sys_jit queries the L2L table for translating the address and then transfers the
execution back to the user space.
A Working Example. To demonstrate how CHAMELEON exactly works, we present a working example in
Figure 2.
At first, the static binary rewriter generates a re-randomization suitable binary (RSB). In this example, the
original binary invokes a call 0x08048078 at 0x08049dd6, which is an inter-page instruction. This
instruction calls the function foo. The static binary rewriter replaces this call with 8 instructions. One of
these instructions calls sys_jit at 0x0810305d. Details of other instructions are explained in §3.1.2.
During the execution of the RSB, sys_jit will be invoked when the foo is to be called. The before-
randomization logical target address 0x08107f10 is passed as an argument to sys_jit (¶). Then
sys_jit splits 0x08107f10 into two parts (·): the page number 0x08107 and the offset 0xf10.
sys_jit looks the page number up in the L2L table to get the after-randomization page number
0x08105 (¸). Adding the offset 0xf10 to 0x08105, sys_jit can get the after-randomization address
0x08105f10 (¹).
In addition, sys_jit will translate the return address to the before-randomization logical address, and
write it to a reserved space in the current stack frame (º and »). Reason of such a recovery is explained in
§3.2.5. Finally, sys_jit has to transfer the execution to the after-randomization address 0x8105f10 (¼,
½ and Ł). Details can be referred to §3.2.2.
3 There could be alternatives of system call as long as we can trap to the kernel, e.g., int3.
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3 Design and Implementation
In this section, we present the design and implementation of the CHAMELEON system. Following the working
process of the system, we first present how we design the static binary rewriter and then explain how we
design the VAPTR unit to work with an instrumented binary.
3.1 Static Binary Rewriter
The goal of the rewriter is to instrument a normal binary program to be compatible with VAPTR. In this
section, we describe how we design the rewriter to achieve such compatibility. First, we explain details of the
instrumentation process of using our rewriter (§3.1.1). Second, we summarize the challenges we faced and
how we address them in the instrumentation process (§3.1.2, §3.1.3). Third, we present the optimizations to
improve the performance of the instrumented binary (§3.1.4).
3.1.1 Instrumentation Process
For different type of instructions, our rewriter takes different instrumenting actions.
In our design, CHAMELEON only randomizes the mapping information for code pages. In particular,
CHAMELEON does not re-randomize the current code page which contains the instructions being executed,
and will continue re-randomizing this page when the execution goes to another page. As such, we do not
instrument intra-page instructions. Here we explain that not instrumenting intra-page instructions does not
make the execution go wrong. Suppose I1 and I2 are two instructions executed sequentially in code page
P and I1 is an intra-page instruction. Under VAPTR, the logical addresses of codes in P are mapped to the
fixed physical addresses. The distance between the physical addresses of I1 and I2 equals to the distance
between their logical addresses. This naturally maintains the normal execution.
For each inter-page instruction, the rewriter replaces it with a RSI unit. A RSI unit is a set of customized
instructions which mainly prepare two arguments for sys_jit and invoke sys_jit. More details are
presented in §3.1.2. In addition, the rewriter inserts a RSI unit at the end of each code page and moves the
instructions whose positions are occupied by the unit to the beginning of the next page.
We build the rewriter on the top of Dyninst[25]. Dyninst can help us identify the inter-page instructions.
However, we face several challenges as follows.
Register Conflicts. Registers used by the neighboring instructions in the instrumentation point might also be
used in a RSI unit. We explain how we handle such register conflicts in §3.1.2.
Memory Expansion. The inserted RSI units will change the code layout and result in memory expansion.
By memory expansion, we mean two situations. First, an intra-page instruction is “pushed" into the next
page. If this instruction is a control flow transfer instruction, it becomes an inter-page instruction. Second, on
the other way around, an inter-page instruction can be changed into an intra-page instruction due to such
“pushing". We explain how we handle such memory expansion in §3.1.3.
Position Independent Code. sys_jit needs to work in a special way when it is invoked in Position
Independent Code (PIC). When instrumenting PIC, the rewriter sets the flag argument of sys_jit to a
special value to indicate the sys_jit is called in PIC and in which dynamic library. VAPTR will use a
special approach to handle PIC code (§3.2.4).
Callback functions. Callback functions in an instrumented program might be used by un-instrumented code,
such as the OS kernel. However, the un-instrumented code will not “know" the after-randomization addresses
of callback functions. To handle this issue, we first identify signal handlers and callback functions that are
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explicitly registered in other functions such as atexit. Then we separate the entry and body of each callback
function. Entries of all callback functions are moved to the same page and we never randomize this page;
while pages containing the bodies are randomized. We place a RSI unit at the entry of each callback function.
When a callback function is invoked, the corresponding RSI unit will be executed and redirect the control
flow to the body of the callback function.
3.1.2 RSI Unit Construction
A RSI unit needs to accomplish three goals: (1) reserving the memory space, (2) saving registers’ contents,
and (3) invoking our sys_jit system call.
Reserving Memory Space. A RSI unit needs to reserve some spaces on the user stack. These spaces will be
used by sys_jit. We use pushf for space reservation. If we use sub $0x8, %esp, the flag register
will be affected.
For different inter-page instructions (replaced by the RSI unit), the RSI unit needs to enforce different
policies regarding the space reservation. Specifically, for call, we reserve two words; for ret, it does
not need any reservation; for jmp/jcc and RSI unit at the end of a code page, we reserve one word. How
sys_jit uses the reserved space will be illustrated in §3.2.2.
Saving Registers Content. The RSI unit needs to save the flag register and all the general purpose registers
into the stack. The purpose is two-fold. First, we need to recover the registers upon exit of sys_jit to
avoid register conflicts caused by the RSI unit. Second, sys_jit might need the values of registers during
address translation (e.g., the saved eflgas can help determine the target address of a replaced jcc). We
use pushf to save the eflags register and pusha to save all the general purpose registers.
Invoking sys_jit. sys_jit takes two arguments: the before-randomization target address of the replaced
inter-page instruction and an additional flag. The flag indicates the type of the replaced instruction, such
as call instruction. The RSI unit uses three move instructions to set the system call number and the two
arguments. In particular, we use call %gs:0x10 to invoke sys_jit.
Example. In Figure 2, the call instruction is replaced by 8 instructions: reserve the stack space (the first two
pushf); store register state (the third pushf and pusha); set up the system call number (mov $0xde,
%eax); set up the two arguments (mov $0x8107f10, %ebx; mov $0x2, %ecx); invoke the system
call (call *%gs:0x10).
3.1.3 Iterative Instrumentation
To address the memory expansion problems, we propose two approaches: (1) we can first insert one RSI
unit before each control flow transfer instruction, including jcc, jmp, call, ret. Then we identify
all intra-page instructions replaced by RSI units. We recover these RSI units back to the original control
flow transfer instructions and pad the redundant spaces with NOP instructions; (2) we iteratively instrument
inter-page instructions in the binary program until we reach a fix point. Each round of instrumentation
is conduced over the original clean binary but analysis of inter-page instructions is based on the layout
of instrumented binary in the previous iteration. The fix point being reached means that the instrumented
inter-pages instructions in the current iteration are identical to those instrumented in the previous iteration.
The first method is simple and quick. However, such an instrumentation strategy unnecessarily adds NOP
for intra-page instructions. More importantly, this strategy does not support rearranging the binary layout,
which prohibit us from performing extra optimizations, such as the two presented in §3.1.4.
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We choose to use the second approach and denote it as “iterative instrumentation". Iterative instrumentation
saves the unnecessary space for instrumenting intra-page instructions and support our optimizations.
A side benefit of our instrumentation is that all intended inter-page instructions are replaced with our RSI
units. This reduces the number of available call, ret, and jmp for ROP attacks and increases the
difficulty for ROP attackers.
3.1.4 Performance Optimization
Each instrumented inter-page instruction needs to trap into the kernel space, which introduces significant
costs due to context switch. Reducing the number of inter-page instructions is therefore a good strategy to
optimize the performance.
Two key observations enable us to do such optimization: (1) many functions have less than one page
of code but spans two pages in the address space. These functions often contain inter-page instructions
whose target addresses are still in the function. We denote these inter-page instructions as type-I optimizable
inter-page instruction; (2) in functions with more than one page of code, many inter-page instruction’s target
addresses are within 4096 bytes and still in the functions. We denote these inter-page instructions as type-II
optimizable inter-page instructions.
We propose two optimizations to remove the above two types of inter-pages instructions: function reordering
and instruction rearranging. Function reordering works on functions with less than 4096 bytes of code (type-I
function); instruction rearranging works on functions with more than 4096 bytes of code (type-II function).
Function reordering. The purpose of function reordering is to move functions with less than one page
of code into a single memory page. Thus, type-I optimizable inter-page instructions are eliminated. The
optimization is completed in five steps. First, we instrument all inter-page instructions in the first iteration of
instrumentation. Second, in each follow-up iteration, we identify and rank type-I functions based on their
code size. Third, we move all type-I functions into lower memory space than type-II functions. Fourth, we
rearrange type-I functions into code pages starting from the code segment and prevent any type-I function
from occupying two pages. Finally, for each page, we put one RSI unit at the end of the page to make
sequential execution through two pages correct.
Instruction rearranging. For type-II optimizable inter-page instructions in type-II functions, we rearrange
these instructions via inserting padding bytes (e.g., NOP) before them. We control the padding to make the
target address and the address of a type-II optimizable inter-page instruction in the same page. To this end,
type-II optimizable inter-page instructions are removed.
3.2 Virtual Address Page Table Remapping
The goal of our VAPTR component is to provide two services: a mechanism to perform the randomization
periodically, and a way to let user space process to query the L2L table and then redirect the control flow to the
target address. Our kth_jit kernel thread (§3.2.1) is designed to achieve the first goal and the sys_jit
system call (§3.2.2) together with our CHAMELEON stub are designed for the second goal. Since both
sys_jit and kth_jit are executed inside the kernel, we also have to take care of their synchronization
(§3.2.3). In §3.2.4 and §3.2.5, we explain how we handle Position Independent Code and dynamically
computed addresses, which are two challenges faced by us. Finally, we present how to secure eip on stack
and disable the use of sys_jit, as a security enhancement strategy in §3.2.6.
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3.2.1 Design of kth_jit
Our kth_jit kernel thread is designed to perform periodically re-randomization operation of the L2L table.
It is invoked at the load time of the binary, and then constantly wakes up to perform the re-randomization by
shuffling the logic page numbers in our L2L table. We use the Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm [28] for our
purpose, and the random source is from the kernel function get_random_bytes.
In addition to shuffling the L2L table, kth_jit also needs to alter the page table entries (PTEs) according
to the current mapping. For example, if logical page L1 in the left column of L2L table corresponds to L2,
the kernel thread will replace L2’s PTE with the PTE of L1. After the kernel thread repeats this operation
for every logical page in the auxiliary table, the page table randomization is completed. We then use kernel
function flush_tlb_range to flush the part of TLB accordingly.
To simplify the page table handling, we currently keep all the code pages into memory at program load
time (using mlock) to avoid the complexities that will be otherwise introduced by swapping.
3.2.2 Design of sys_jit & CHAMELEON stub
As illustrated in our working example, our sys_jit needs to determine the original target address to get the
original page number, look up the L2L table to get the new page number, and finally redirect the control flow
to the destination address.
Determining the Target Address. To decide the after-randomization address, we need to know its original
before randomization address such that we can query our L2L table. For direct call/jmp, their target
addresses are explicitly given in the binary code, and we can directly fetch them from the target address
argument of sys_jit. For those dynamically computed target addresses (e.g., load from a memory or
register) such as call/jmp *ecx, we will pass their run-time address to our sys_jit argument. In
most cases, the run-time addresses are before-randomization addresses determined by the compiler or loader,
for example, jump table, virtual function table. However, there are some special cases that run-time addresses
are after-randomization addresses (calculated from eip). If sys_jit receives such address and looks up
L2L table, the result will be incorrect. To solve this problem, we restore the eip to before-randomization
address when it is saved on user stack (details is in §3.2.5).
There are also some other target addresses we have to decide at runtime. Specifically, (1) if the inter-page
instruction is a conditional jump, we need to determine the target address based on eflags and/or ecx
(note instruction such as jcxz/jecxz will jump if ecx is 0). (2) If the instrumented instruction is ret, we
need to get the before-randomization return address from the kernel (§3.2.6).
Querying L2L Table. sys_jit will query L2L table for two tasks: (1) given the before-randomization
address to get the after-randomization target address, and (2) given the after-randomization address to get
the before-randomization return address. For task (1), since the left column of the L2L table represents page
number, it just needs to convert logical address to page number (by addr & PAGE_MASK) before looking
up the L2L table, use this page number as the entry to find the after-randomization page number. For task
(2), similar to task (1), the system call inquires the L2L table to get the before-randomization page number
and calculate the before-randomization return address. Note that after-randomization target address and
before-randomization return address will be saved at the reserved space by RSI unit (Recall §3.1.1).
Redirecting the Control Flow – CHAMELEON Stub. Before redirecting the control flow to a target address,
our sys_jit has to perform some restoration. Considering the fact that this restoration procedure is exactly
the same for all types of instrumentations, we simply include the restoration procedure inside a wrapper
function and we call it CHAMELEON stub. Therefore, right before the sys_jit finishes its execution, it will
modify the saved return address (which is in the top of user stack) with the entry address of CHAMELEON
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stub. Then the control flow will directly go to the CHAMELEON stub, which will popa and popf to restore
the registers. The CHAMELEON stub is also just-in-time randomized (resistant to just-in-time code reuse
attacks) and we store them in a separate page.
After the context restoration, it is safe to change the control flow to the after-randomization target address.
Here similar to ROP, we use a trick to set the target address. Specifically, instead of inserting a jump instruction
after returning from the CHAMELEON stub, we insert a ret instruction in the Chameleon stub, and replace
its return address with the after-randomization target address. Such replacement operation is achieved inside
the sys_jit system call.
As shown in Figure 2, sys_jit modifies the return address in the current stack frame to be the entry
address of the stub. In addition, sys_jit writes the after-randomization target address 0x8105f10 to a
reserved space in the stack (¼). When sys_jit returns, the execution will be redirected to the stub (½).
Finally the stub returns to the after-randomization target address (i.e, 0x8105f10) stored in the reserved
stack space (Ł).
3.2.3 Synchronization between kth_jit & sys_jit
Since both kth_jit and sys_jit need to access the shared L2L table, a proper synchronization between
them is needed. On one hand, our sys_jit only needs to look up the shared table (i.e., read-only). On the
other hand, our kth_jit randomizes and modifies the shared tabled (i.e., read-write). We leverage the
kernel rw_semaphore to synchronize the accesses to L2L table. The system call will call down_read()
and up_read() to hold and release the read lock and the kernel thread will call down_write() and
up_write() correspondingly. Besides, we employ schedule_timeout() to implement the timed
sleep of the kernel thread.
We have to set/reset the current executing page as no-re-randomize page in a white list, as such a different
synchronization policy is needed. This is because the kernel thread will only read the information and
the system calls will both read and write the information. As sys_jit and kth_jit have already been
mutually excluded by the rw_semaphore, we only need to prevent multiple system calls (in a multithreaded
program) from concurrently modifying the white list. Since the set/reset operations are supposed to be very
quick, we choose the spinlock. It is worth noting that for a single-threaded process, the spinlock can
actually be eliminated, which can potentially improve the performance.
Regarding multithreaded programs, they are naturally supported by our design, because threads in the
same process share the same set of page table and they can concurrently issue sys_jit system calls which
have already been appropriately synchronized with the kernel thread. In order to support multiple processes
running at the same time, each process needs to be randomized timely and correctly. Thus, we associate a
different kernel thread for every process and we dynamically allocate (i.e., kmalloc) the L2L table for each
process. We store a reference to the L2L table in each process’s task_struct so that the system calls can
quickly identify the corresponding table to look up.
3.2.4 Position Independent Code
CHAMELEON does support securing the position independent code (PIC). In particular, during the static
instrumentation phase of PIC, the flag argument of sys_jit is set to indicate the invoking code is PIC
and which library it belongs to. In the kernel space unit, we take following actions. First, we hook the
mmap_pgoff in the kernel space to get information of each loaded and instrumented dynamic library,
including (1) the current process id; (2) the base address of the library; (3) the name of the library. Knowing
the start offset and end offset of the code segment, kth_jit can understand the start address and end address
of the library. Then the code pages of the library are put in the L2L table together with the code pages of the
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1a50 <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>:
1a50:       8b 1c 24                     
1a53:       c3
5a60 <__init_des>:
5a60:       53                                  push   %ebx
5a61:       e8 ea bf ff ff
5a66:       81 c3 9a 35 00 00       
5a6c:       83 ec 18                         sub    $0x18,%esp
5a6f:       8d 83 c0 70 00 00 
call   1a50 <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx >
add    $0x359a,%ebx
lea    0x70c0(%ebx),%eax
mov (%esp),%ebx
ret
49894aab <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>:
49894aab:   8b 1c 24
49894aae:   9c
49894aaf:   60                                pusha
49894ab0:  8b 4c 00                        mov 0x0,%ecx
49894ab3:  b8 de 00 00 00              mov $0xde,%eax
49894ab8:  bb 11 00 00 00               mov $0x11,%ebx
49894abd:  65 ff 15 10 00 00 00      call   *%gs:0x10
49893a89 <__init_des>:
49893a89:  53                                   push   %ebx
49893a8a:   9c                                  pushf
49893a8b:   9c                                   pushf
49893a8c:   9c                                  pushf
49893a8d:   60                                  pusha
49893a8e:   b8 de 00 00 00             mov $0xde,%eax
49893a83:   b9 ab 1a 10                    mov $0x101aab,%ecx
49893a87:   bb 12 00 00 50                mov $0x12,%ebx
49893a8c:   65 ff 15 10 00 00 00
49893a93:   81 c3 6d c5 00 00
49893a99:   83 ec 18                        sub    $0x18,%esp
49893a9c:   8d 83 c0 70 00 00     
key
…
key
.bss
0x49894aab
.stack
+0xc56d
mov (%esp),%ebx
add    $0xc56d,%ebx
lea    0x70c0(%ebx),%eax
pushf
pusha
mov 0x0, ecx
mov $0xde, eax
ov $0x11, ebx
call   * gs:0x10
f
pushf
f
mov $0xde, eax
ov $0x101aab, ecx
mov $0x12,%ebx
call   *%gs:0x10
0x101aab
libcrypt.so1529 0x49791000
pid lib name base address
Loaded Dynamic Library Information
+
0x49896a93
0x49892aab
sys_jit
…
0x49893a93
0x49892 0x49894
0x49896 0x49893
L2L Table
eax
0xbf194308 0x49896a93
ebx
EIP Shadow Table
0xbf194308
User
Kernel
Code snippet in libcrypt.so
Code snippet in loaded instrumented libcrypt.so
…
…
Return AddrUse Stack Addr
0x498a3000
Figure 3: Dynamic Library libcrypt.so
application. At the end of randomization cycle, kth_jit updates the GOT table for the library based on the
newest L2L table. After that, when a sys_jit is invoked in PIC, the sys_jit checks the target address
passed as an argument. If the target address is less than the base address of its containing library, we will add
it with the base address.
We take the instruction call 0x1a50 from libcrypt.so in Figure 3 as an example to illustrate
how we handle PIC. After static instrumentation, call 0x1a50 is replaced by a RGI unit (0x49893a8a-
0x49893a92). The flag arguments 0x12 ofsys_jit indicates the code is call instruction in libcrypt.so.
After libcrypt.so is loaded into a process (e.g., httpd), the kernel will record the loaded dynamic library
information: the process id (0x1529), library name libcrypt.so and base address 0x49791000. At
runtime, when sys_jit is invoked at address 0x49893a8c with target address argument 0x101aab,
sys_jit will look up loaded dynamic library information, and add the base address 0x49791000 to get
the target address 0x49892aab. As we illustrated in §3.2.2, sys_jit will look up the L2L table, write
the after-randomization target address 0x49894aab in the reserved space in user stack, and transfer the
control flow to 0x49894aab (i.e., __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx).
3.2.5 Dynamically Computed Address
As discussed in §3.2.2, dynamically computed addresses could be before-randomization addresses or after-
randomization addresses. Before-randomization addresses can be directly used to do L2L table query. So
here we focus on the second type of dynamically computed addresses.
The reason for a dynamically computed address to be after randomization is that the saved eip on the
user stack is used in the address computing. On a 32-bit Linux, eip cannot be directly accessed by any
instruction. In two ways, eip will be indirectly accessed and saved to the stack: (1) call instruction saves
the current eip on the stack as return value; (2) during signal handling, the kernel saves the eip in a signal
frame (sigframe) by setup_frame, and later stores the user content by sig_return. We denote the
addresses that dynamically computed from the saved eip on the stack as EIP relative addresses.
Taking the global variable (key) in libcrypt.so in Figure 3 for example, key is in the bss segment
with a fixed offset 0x70c0. To get the address of key: (1) the PIC code uses “call 1a50" to save the
return address (i.e., address of “add $0x359a,%ebx") on the stack; then “mov (%esp),%ebx" assigns
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Table 1: Statistics of the Instrumented Programs.
Programs Orig_Sizes RSB_Sizes Iter_Count Orig_Page RSB_Page Padding #total #RSI(KB) (KB) (Bytes) CFT in Orig units
cat 292 318 24 8 11 401 1652 194
tail 368 455 25 11 15 462 2298 240
ls 644 969 57 18 30 728 3901 428
du 664 979 56 20 31 892 4313 432
cp 684 986 56 19 32 1033 4078 452
sort 624 716 44 17 26 837 3455 403
head 228 204 21 6 8 370 1193 152
base64 200 164 13 5 11 287 953 136
expand 176 142 17 5 9 123 771 118
unexpand 176 140 14 5 9 110 806 120
paste 176 130 16 5 9 263 780 120
xz-5.1.4beta 385 483 40 11 18 729 2325 216
bzip2-1.0.6 402 643 39 16 22 396 2733 232
ghttpd-1.4-4 92 65 6 3 5 89 444 56
httpd-2.2.27 2867 3621 136 77 116 3072 17184 1945
nginx-1.6.0 3788 4154 157 98 147 4017 22040 2765
lighttpd-1.4.35 1024 1419 73 27 42 2053 5906 707
the return address to ebx, and “add $0x359a,%ebx" calculates the base address of .bss segment (the
offset of “add $0x359a,%ebx" to bss segment is 0x359a). Finally, “lea 0x70c0(%ebx),%eax"
assigns the address of key to eax. The address of key is an EIP relative address. In the loaded instrumented
libcrypt.so, the return address is 0x49893a93 which is after-randomization address. After adding the
offset (0xc56d), the base address of bss segment will be calculated as 0x498a0000, which is not the
correct base address (0x498a3000). Note if we use the before-randomization return address 0x49896a93
to calculate the base address, we will get the correct result.
To handle EIP relative address, when saving eip on user stack, sys_jit or setup_frame (hooked by
us) will save the before-randomization address. Take the working example in Figure 2 for example, sys_jit
splits the return address (0x8103063) with a page number 0x8103 and offset 0x63 (º), and then performs
an inverse query of L2L table to get the page number of the before randomization return address, which
is 0x8109 in this case (»). Consequently, the before randomization return address will be 0x8109063,
and we should put this address in the reserved stack space. Similarly, we save before-randomization return
address 0x49896a93 on the stack in Figure 3.
3.2.6 Security Enhancement
Secure the saved eip. To handle EIP relative addresses, we save the before-randomization value of eip on
the stack. The attack (e.g., ROP attack [40] and SROP [10]) might attempt to modify these saved values to
the addresses of malicious gadgets (addresses of these gadgets can be analyzed offline). To secure the saved
eip, we rely on the kernel space to provide protection. In the kernel space, CHAMELEON maintains an EIP
shadow table in the kernel space, which contains the before-randomization value of saved eip and the saving
location. For instance, in Figure 3, the return address (0x49896a93) and its saving location 0xbf194308
are stored in the EIP shadow table. When sys_jit (replacing the ret) or sig_return (hooked by us)
restores the eip, it (1) looks up the EIP shadow table to get the eip ; (2) gets the after-randomization address
through L2L table; (3) restores the eip to the after-randomization address. In this way, no matter how the
saved eip on stack is crafted, the control flow is valid because it is based on eip saved in the EIP shadow
table in the kernel space.
How can we disable reuse of sys_jit. An astute attacker might be interested in extending “one-two
punch" ROP attacks with reusing sys_jit. However, our approach makes reuse of sys_jit nearly
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impossible. First, it is difficult for an attacker to constantly identify the locations of RSI units since pages
containing RSI units are actively and periodically randomized. Second, even if an attacker can always get the
correct locations of RSI units, the attacker needs to fake the arguments of sys_jit, especially the target
address argument. There are three types of target address: (1) hard-coded label; (2) return address; (3) register
or register involved memories (e.g., jmp %eax ). With DEP enabled, it is hard for the attacker to craft the
hard-coded label in code segment. So it is difficult to reuse sys_jit with the first type of return address
argument; in our design, all return addresses are maintained in the kernel, which is impossible to be modified
by an attacker without root privilege. To this end, it is impossible for the attacker to reuse sys_jit with the
second type of return address argument; to reuse sys_jit with the third type of return address argument, the
attacker needs to modify the registers to make it either point to the gadget address or the memory that contains
the gadget address. However, register modification requires execution of specific gadgets (e.g., dispatch
gadgets) [12, 9]. To execute any gadgets without reusing sys_jit has been explained to be impossible
when our defense principle is enforced by VAPTR. In summary, it is never easy for an attacker to reuse
sys_jit.
4 Evaluation
We have implemented CHAMELEON. Our user level static binary instrumentation component is implemented
on the top of DyninstAPI library (8.1.2) [25], with additional 9000 lines of C++ code, and our kernel
component (VAPTR) and the sys_jit are implemented atop Linux kernel 3.16.0 with over 1100 lines of C
code added. In this section, we present our evaluation results.
We first evaluated the effectiveness of CHAMELEON with a number of JIT-ROP attacks (§4.1), and then
tested the performance of programs protected by CHAMELEON (§4.2). The experiment suit consists of 113
programs: among them, 107 programs are from the coreutils toolchain (8.21) [16], 2 programs from
commonly used compression software (xz, bzip2), and 4 programs from web servers (ghttpd, httpd,
nginx,lighttpd). All the tests are conducted on an Intel(R) Core2 Duo CPU E8400, 3.00GHz desktop
with 2GB physical RAM.
4.1 Effectiveness
4.1.1 Static Binary Instrumentation
We successfully instrumented all of the 113 binaries. Due to space limitation, Table 1 only presents the
statistics for 17 programs, and among them 11 are from the coreutils (the criteria of selection is based on the
run time, and these programs take longer time that all others). The first column is the names of the program;
the 2nd column and 3rd column are the size of original binary and the instrumented binary, respectively. We
notice that the average increase of the binary file size is 47.2%; the 4th column reports the number of iterations
our instrumentation takes. In general the iteration count depends on the size of the binary. In particular,
the largest iteration count is 157 (nginx) and the smallest one is 6 (ghttpd); the 5th column reports the
number of code pages in the original binary and the 6th column reports that of the instrumented binary (i.e.,
the RSB). About 50% more code pages are introduced; the 7th column reports the size of padding inserted in
the instrumented binary; the 9th column reports the number of RSI units inserted to the instrumented binary.
For all of the test programs, we inserted on average 31 padding bytes and 21 RSI units per page.
To show how many control flow transfer (CFT) instructions in the original binary are instrumented by
RSI units, we compared the total number of CFT instructions in the original binary (the 8th column) with
the number of RSI units (the 9th column), and found that 24.7% CFT instructions in the original binary
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Table 2: Security Evaluation of CHAMELEON
Programs
wo/ CHAMELEON on original binary w/ CHAMELEON on instrumented binary
Memory Gadgets Discovery And Gadgets Memory Gadgets Discovery And Gadgets
Disclosure Just-in-time Compilation Execution Disclosure Just-in-time Compilation Execution
# of Pages Time (ms) # of Gadgets Time (ms) # of Gadgets # of Pages # of Gadgets # of Gadgets
cat 5 255.69 710 2852.25 15 1 89 0
tail 7 314.95 1291 3589.72 22 1 116 0
ls 10 319.05 2137 3669.57 22 1 154 0
du 10 320.35 2083 3601.66 22 1 122 0
cp 14 325.83 2251 3755.16 21 1 78 0
sort 12 324.63 2562 3698.74 22 1 94 0
head 4 314.29 699 3561.91 22 1 66 0
base64 3 308.36 614 3442.44 22 1 65 0
expand 3 318.44 545 3552.72 22 1 79 0
unexpand 3 320.47 527 3552.07 22 1 78 0
paste 4 320.14 662 3578.12 22 1 65 0
xz 10 321.74 1793 3660.82 22 1 76 0
bzip2 13 392.80 1788 3927.24 23 1 142 0
ghttpd 1 8.56 96 0 0 1 33 0
httpd 27 314.54 3978 3182.25 21 1 177 0
nginx 86 447.53 13393 4675.23 24 1 184 0
lighttpd 32 345.78 5452 3629.13 24 1 104 0
are instrumented. To be short, we will use iCFT (inter-page control flow transfer) instructions to represent
inter-page instructions.
4.1.2 Defense against the JIT Code Reuse Attack
Attack Construction. To test the effectiveness of CHAMELEON against JIT code reuse attacks, we first
construct a set of JIT code exploits against all the original binaries as well as the instrumented binaries. Since a
tested program may not have the desired vulnerability, similar to how JIT-ROP [41] evaluates their techniques,
we create a shared library that is linked by each tested program to simulate the JIT-ROP attack. This library
contains our exploit routine that will perform memory disclosure and gadget collection, just-in-time gadgets
compilation, and gadgets execution. To hijack the program control flow to execute the routines in our shared
library, we directly patch the entry address of the program and let it directly execute our attack payload.
Attack Results. We run the constructed exploit against both the original binaries and the instrumented
binaries. Table 2 presents our experimental result. From the 2nd column to the 6th column, we present the
statistics without CHAMELEON, and from the 7th column to the 9th column, we present the statistics with
CHAMELEON.
Regarding the original binary programs without CHAMELEON protection, all of them can be successfully
attacked except the ghttpd, which has too few (only 96) gadgets to perform even a simple attack (e.g., open
a shell). Nevertheless, we can still complete the memory disclosure task against it. Since the time of “gadgets
execution" is very short (no more than 1µs), we only show the time consumed by the other two tasks in the
table. On average, 14 pages are scanned (between 1 and 86), which take 310.18ms. On average, 2387 gadgets
are discovered (between 96 and 13393) and it takes 3620.56ms to discover and compile these gadgets. 15-24
selected gadgets are executed to complete the attack.
When attacking instrumented binaries, we run with three different re-randomization time intervals: 1ms,
10ms, 100ms, and all of the exploit routines failed without any exception. The reasons for choosing such
re-randomization intervals are discussed in §5. We observe that all failures share some common characteristics.
First, only one page can be scanned no matter which binary is being attacked, and that page is the attack
starting page. This is because we have eliminated all the iCFT instructions to prevent the attack from
disclosing other pages. Second, the number of discovered gadgets is 99 on average, and all of them are on the
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Table 3: Gadget Statistics
Programs Original Binary Instrumented Binary#Gadgets # Gadgets
cat 1200 401
tail 1979 984
ls 4029 2001
du 3963 1793
cp 3613 918
sort 3645 1377
head 1057 356
base64 1006 341
expand 906 428
unexpand 878 259
paste 815 231
xz 1964 859
bzip2 2210 1225
ghttpd 281 101
httpd 12893 6305
nginx 16161 7272
lighttpd 4967 2185
same page (i.e., the attack starting page). The number of discovered gadgets is sharply reduced by 95.9%
compared to the original binary. Third, for all the test programs, the gadget compilation cannot succeed
because the exploit routine failed to identify sufficient amount of gadgets in order to achieve a simple task
(i.e., opening a shell). Finally, to evaluate the effectiveness of our just-in-time randomization, we compile a
very limited number of discovered gadgets (2-10 gadgets) and executed them to do some specific operations
(e.g., data movement). The execution of the selected gadgets cannot be completed and the exploit routines
always crashed. We find that the crash of the gadgets execution is due to our re-randomization.
Note that if the attacker uses side channel-based techniques [7, 38] to collect the gadgets on-the-fly, it
generally will need more time. For example, the fastest exploit of BROP [7] takes 1 minute against nginx.
To exploit the Apache Web Server, [38] takes 30.58 sec under traditional ASLR [43], and even 1 week under
fine-grained ASLR protection. During such a period, CHAMELEON would perform re-randomization for
hundreds of times. If the re-randomization interval is 100ms, Chameleon will perform more than 300 times
of re-randomization during 30.58 sec. As such, we believe CHAMELEON has the capability to defeat these
side channel attacks.
Table 4: Runtime Statistics of the Instrumented Programs
Programs Commands or Benchmarks #RSI unit #unique RSI > 106 > 105 > 104 > 103executions units involved
cat cat a 1.3MB file 1,039 24 0 0 0 0
tail tail the last 1M lines from a 3.0MB file 370 33 0 0 0 0
ls ls a directory that contains 100K files 20,260 150 0 0 0 5
du du a 4GB directory trees 4,716,284 610 0 3 64 220
cp copy 430MB files 4,347,857 280 0 7 76 125
sort sort a 1.3MB file 9,820,150 224 2 20 24 25
head head the first 1M lines from a 3.0MB file 748 18 0 0 0 0
base64 base64 a 3.0MB file 1,951 14 0 0 0 0
expand expand a 3.0MB file 119,009 13 1 1 1 1
paste paste a 3.0MB file 241,688 23 0 0 4 4
unexpand unexpand a 3.0MB file 119,811 17 0 0 2 2
xz-5.1.4beta compress a 3.0MB file 1,757 110 0 0 0 0
bzip2-1.0.6 compress a 12.3MB file 51,576,587 365 14 26 190 206
ghttpd-1.4-4 wget http://ip:port/index.html 213 15 0 0 0 0
httpd-2.2.27 ab -k -n50000 -c100 http://ip:80/index.html 1,584,667 427 0 1 21 245
nginx-1.6.0 ab -k -n50000 -c100 http://ip:80/index.html 4,240,472 1,066 0 12 285 294
lighttpd-1.4.35 ab -k -n50000 -c100 http://ip:80/index.html 2,339,981 750 0 12 76 311
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Figure 4: Runtime Overhead
Worst Case Analysis. In our simulated attack, we assume the attacker follows the steps in JIT-ROP [41].
Next, we elevate the attacker’s potential to an extreme case, namely, every gadget could be used by the
attacker. However, by comparing the original binary and the instrumented binary in terms of the total number
of gadgets, we can find that our RSB has significantly less gadgets as shown in Table 3. More specifically,
compared with the average 3621 gadgets in the original binaries, the instrumented binaries only have 1590
gadgets, with a significant decrease of 56.1%. It is worth mentioning that the remaining gadgets are all
unintended gadgets, and all the intended gadgets have been removed by the nature of our technique (recall
that all the ret instruction in the original binary has been replaced).
4.2 Runtime Overhead
Next, we measured the runtime overhead for the tested programs. For each program, we measured the
followings: (1) runtime statistics of the instrumented binaries without no-security-loss optimization, (2)
runtime overhead with no-security-loss optimization, and (3) the effectiveness of optimization. For each test,
we ran the program 1,000 times and calculated the average.
Table 5: Evaluation Result of Our Performance Optimization
Program
Before Optimization After Optimization
Overhead # of RSI unit # of RSI unit executions Overhead # of RSI unit # of RSI unit executionsexecutions >106 >105 >104 >103 executions >106 >105 >104 >103
ls 9.2% 20,260 0 0 0 5 4.3% 10,264 0 0 0 1
du 16.4% 4,716,284 0 3 64 220 8.4% 3,400,698 0 0 44 154
cp 10.4% 4,347,857 0 7 76 125 7.8% 3,271,124 0 2 62 97
sort 35.5% 9,820,150 2 20 24 25 16.1% 4,972,380 1 11 11 11
expand 3.1% 119,009 1 1 1 1 0.1% 12 0 0 0 0
unexpand 4.8% 119,811 0 0 2 2 0.9% 60,967 0 0 1 1
paste 10.5% 241,688 0 0 4 4 4.5% 120,864 0 0 2 2
bzip2 136.7% 51,576,587 14 26 190 206 31.3% 11,713,541 1 12 174 189
httpd 14.1% 1,584,667 0 1 21 245 9.1% 884,289 0 0 3 181
nginx 26.4% 4,240,472 0 12 285 294 18.1% 2,389,676 0 8 203 212
lighthttpd 21.2% 2,339,981 0 12 76 311 13.8% 1,338,676 0 4 63 242
Runtime RSI Execution Statistics. Table 4 shows the runtime statistics of 17 selected programs when
running without no-security-loss optimization. The 2nd column shows the specific shell commands or
benchmarks. The runtime overhead is mainly due to the RSI units, since the padding (NOP sequence) will
introduce negligible overhead. The statistics include the total number of executed RSI units (the 3rd column)
and the number of unique RSI units involved (the 4th column). As we can see, ghttpd executed the smallest
number of RSI units (213), while bzip2 executed the largest number of RSI units (51,576,587). Note that
bzip2 used an extremely large number of loops.
We denoted the RSI units which are executed more than 1,000 times as frequently executed RSI units. We
further decomposed the frequently executed RSI units into four categories in Table 4. For example, “>106”
means the number of unique RSI units that are executed over 106 times per each. bzip2 has 14 such RSI
units, expand has 1 such RSI unit and sort has 2 such RSI units. Although the number of the frequently
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executed RSI units shares only 21.3% of all RSI units, the frequently executed RSI units consume 82.6% of
the total number of executions. In fact, after applying the no-security-loss optimization presented in §3.1.3,
we can safely remove some of the frequently executed RSI units.
Runtime Overhead. For the 113 binaries with no-security-loss optimization, we run four sets of test. We
first run the original program. Then we run the instrumented program with three different re-randomization
intervals, namely, 100ms, 10ms, and 1ms. And for each set of test, we run the executable 1,000 times.
The average runtime overhead under the three intervals are 11.1%, 12.1%, and 12.9%, respectively. When
we calculate the average runtime overhead, only the binaries that have an execution time longer than a
threshold (i.e., 500ms) are considered. We get 44 binaries in this category. Fig. 4 shows the runtime overhead
measurement for the 17 selected programs.
By correlating with Table 4, we can see that the runtime overhead is heavily correlated with the number of
executed RSI units and the number of frequently executed RSI unites. The higher the numbers are, the more
runtime overhead will be introduced. In practice, we noticed that if the number of executed RSI units is less
than 2,000, the performance overhead is negligible (e.g., 0.1% for xz). Some instrumented executables (e.g.,
cat, tail, base64 and head) even get better performance than the original binaries. One possible reason
is that improved memory locality is achieved due to our instrumentation.
Note that about 60% test programs in the coreutils run less than 500ms and execute only 10-20 RSI units.
Although the absolute number of RSI units is lower, the relative time consumption of RSI units can be higher.
In addition, the initialization overhead (including the creation of kth_jit kernel thread and the L2L Table)
has a greater impact on short-lived programs. As a result, many of the small command-line programs, such
hostid, logname, and whoami, have runtime overhead of up to 30%.
In addition to the coreutils, we also test three web server programs: httpd-2.2.27, nginx-1.6.0,
and lighttpd-1.4.35. We use the ApacheBench (ab) to simulate 50,000 HTTP GET requests and
evaluate the performance when setting the re-randomization interval to 100ms. Without optimization, we
observe 1,584K, 4,240K, 2,339K executions of RSI units, respectively, for these programs; with optimization,
we observe 884K, 2,389K, 1,338K executions of RSI units, yielding a reduction of 44.2%, 43.7% and 42.8%,
respectively. Consequently, as shown in Figure 4 and Table 5, the runtime overhead is reduced from 11.7% to
9.1%, 20.7% to 18.1%, 16.7% to 13.8%, respectively, for these programs.
Dynamic Library Evaluation. We also include a number of dynamic libraries in our test suit: libcrypt.so,
libutils.so and libssl.so. In our experiments, we successfully instrumented all these libraries. In
particular, we select the instrumented libssl.so to evaluate how it affects the performance of the web
server software (httpd, nginx, lighttpd). Note that libssl.so is widely used in web applications
to provide https service and should be a representative candidate for our evaluation. With our optimization
performed, CHAMELEON instruments 3, 843 inter-page instructions in libssl.so, which are 24.5% of
total control flow instructions (15, 684). For each instrumented web application, we link it with the orig-
inal libssl.so and the instrumented libssl.so to evaluate the performance difference. By setting
the HTTPS benchmark as ab -k -n50000 -c100 https://ip:443/index.html and setting
re-randomization interval as 10ms, we observe that CHAMELEON introduces 10.8%, 23.1% and 16.3%
performance overhead, respectively. We look further to see how many RGI units get executed, and find that
948K, 2,798K, and 1,433K RGI units executed in httpd, nginx and lightttpd, respectively.
Effectiveness of Our Optimization. To measure the effectiveness of the optimizations presented in §3.1.3,
we select 11 programs that contain frequently executed RSI units to compare the runtime overhead before
and after the optimization, using 100ms re-randomization interval. Table 5 represents the results.
Overall, the average overhead is reduced by 59.9% (from 26.2% to 10.5%). It turns out that the program
bzip2 benefits the most from the optimization. The overhead is reduced from 136.7% to 31.3%. As the
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performance improvement primarily comes from the reduction in the number of executed RSI units, we
collect the number of executed RSI units before and after optimization. Although the reduction of unique RSI
units is 24.2%, the gross reduction rate of executed RSI units is 64.4%. This indicates that our optimization
reduces the frequently executed RSI units to a large extent.
5 Discussions
How long should each randomization cycle be. The length of each randomization cycle is critical to our
approach. The cycle being too long would leave a door for the attack to get in; the cycle being too short
would introduce high overhead. It is hard to theoretically identify a secure length of each randomization cycle
to stop all attacks. We determine the length of each randomization cycle via mimic JIT-ROP attacks against
the program to be protected. Details of experiments are presented in §4.1 and results are presented in Table
2. The shortest time to conduct a JIT-ROP attack is over 3,000 ms (cat). Note that in real-world attacks,
the time should be much longer, due to issues such as network delay and vulnerability exploitation. So we
provide three options for the randomization cycle: 1 ms, 10 ms, and 100 ms. In fact, if necessary, we can set
the randomization interval to be much shorter.
Compatibility between Chameleon and ASLR. ALSR is a commonly used defense technique built-in
modern Linux kernels. We tested whether CHAMELEON is compatible with ASLR using the experiment suit.
The results show that all programs protected by CHAMELEON run correctly when ASLR is enabled.
6 Related Work
Since the introduction of data execution prevention (DEP), attackers cannot execute the injected code any
more, and they have to reuse the existing code for the malicious purpose. Over the past decades, we have
witnessed this code reuse attack evolved from return-into-libc [32, 22], to ROP/JOP [40, 37, 12, 9, 11], to the
most recent just-in-time ROP [41, 7, 38]. In this section, we discuss the defense against these attacks and
compare CHAMELEON with the most related one.
Defense based on gadget patterns. Due to the nature of the diverting the control flow and executing the
existing program code, these code reuse attacks often expose distinctive patterns from benign program
execution. For instance, they often have short code snippets (i.e., usually less than five instructions); there
is no corresponding “call" for the “ret" instructions; the control flow transfer heavily depends on the “ret"
instructions.
In light of this, DROP [14] detects ROP attack based on the heavy use of “ret” for control flow transfer.
ROPDefender [21] is based on the matched pair of call and return. kBouncer [35] and ROPecker [15] is
based on the length of the gadget as well as the sequence of consecutive gadgets. However, two recent
efforts [20, 23] have demonstrated these pattern based approach can be broken. Therefore, there are other
efforts such as G-Free [33] and Return-less [29] proposing to remove the “ret" instructions so as to block the
ROP attack.
Defense based on randomization. Since attackers have to know the address to which they can divert the
control flow, another appealing defense is to randomize the locations of program code such that the address
identified by attackers will fail. A large number of randomization techniques have been proposed, and they
differ at the granularity such as segment offset level [43, 4], page level [3], function level [27], basic block
level [34], and instruction level [45, 24]. Also, the randomization can occur at compile time (e.g., [6]) or
load-time (e.g., [45, 4, 3]).
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However, most of the existing ASLR only performs a one-time randomization. It thus leads to the JIT-ROP
attacks [41, 7, 38]. A natural response would be to keep re-randomizing the program code. An early attempt
is execution path randomization proposed by Isomeron [19]. Basically, with dynamic binary instrumentation,
Isomeron keeps a copy of original code and the other copy of randomized code at runtime and randomly flips
to execute either the original code or randomized code at function granularity. While CHAMELEON shares
similar motivation of re-randomization, the substantial difference are (1) Isomeron does not follow our new
defense principle, in other words, address-code associations are still kept under execution path randomization.
It is possible that the attacker can hijack the control flow to execute JIT-ROP attacks without triggering the
path execution randomization (function call). (2) Isomeron is dynamic binary instrumentation based, and it
suffers from high performance overhead (2-5X); whereas CHAMELEON is much more practical and it uses
static binary instrumentation with a number of optimization techniques, leading to around 10% performance
overhead.
Other Defenses. With the same motivation of JIT code reuse attack, an approach named “Execute-no-Read"
(XnR) is recently proposed [2]. The key idea is to ensure that code can still be executed by the processor,
but cannot be read as data, which essentially forfeits the self-disassembly that is necessary for JIT code
reuse attacks. However, gadget collection can still be done without “reading code as data". For example, the
recently proposed BROP attack [7] can utilize a side channel (i.e., program crashes or not) to probe a valid
gadget, without the need to actually read and disassemble the code. More advanced side channel attacks that
do not require crashing the application have also been proposed [38]. It has been shown that a couple of fault
analysis and timing channels can allow a remote attacker to learn how code has been diversified without
needing to read the code. In both cases, XnR is incompetent to defeat the code reuse attacks. In comparison,
CHAMELEON does periodical re-randomization. No matter how a gadget is collected, its logical address
could have already been changed at the time of gadget execution. In this sense, CHAMELEON provides a
more fundamental mechanism to defend against JIT code reuse attacks.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a new principle to instantly obsolete the address and code mapping to defeat the “one-two
punch” code reuse attack. We have instantiated this principle with a novel technique called virtual address
page table remapping and implemented in a system CHAMELEON, to periodically re-randomize the locations
of code pages on-the-fly. To achieve this, we have developed a set of techniques including iterative instrumen-
tation technique that instruments a to-be-protected binary program to generate a re-randomization suitable
binary, runtime virtual page shuffling, and function reordering and instruction rearranging optimizations.
The experiment results with over a hundred binary programs show that all of “one-two punch” code reuse
attacks are defeated by our system. The re-randomization interval can be set as short as 100ms, 10ms or 1ms,
and the experiment results show that CHAMELEON only introduces on average 11.1%, 12.1% and 12.9%
performance overhead under these settings.
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